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The Psychiatrist's Dilemma: Protect the Public
Or Safeguard Individual Liberty?
Fay Anne Freedman*
More than a decade has passed since the landmark case of
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California.1  In
Tarasoff, the California Supreme Court ruled that a psychia-
trist is under a duty to use reasonable care to warn an intended
victim of a patient's dangerous condition if the psychiatrist
knows or should have known that the patient presents a seri-
ous danger of violence to that particular individual.2 Through-
out the years, courts have increasingly relied on Tarasoff as
support for imposing a duty on mental health professionals to
protect third parties. Washington law,3  however, takes
Tarasoff an unreasonable step further, requiring a psychiatrist
to take precautions to protect anyone who might foreseeably
be endangered by his patient's mental problems. This duty
includes the duty to protect the public at large from an individ-
ual's dangerous propensities, including those that are drug-
related.4
In Petersen v. State,5 the Washington Supreme Court,
while reaffirming the current law which requires those with
special powers, skills, and knowledge gained through the doc-
tor-patient relationship to discharge a legal duty to protect,
dramatically widened the scope of a psychiatrist's responsibil-
ity to include a duty to protect unintended or unidentifiable
victims. By expanding this duty, the court recognized that it
confronted difficult issues of first impression for the state.
These issues included the nature of the psychiatrist-patient
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1. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
2. Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.120 (1987); Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671
P.2d 230 (1983).
4. Petersen, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983).
5. Id.
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relationship, the effect of a psychiatrist's decision to release his
patient from involuntary civil commitment, and the duty a psy-
chiatrist owes to third parties for the behavior of his patient.
This Article argues that the psychiatrist's' dual duty of
protecting others, while effectively treating patients, places the
psychiatrist in a dilemma.7 Petersen's expansion of the law
exacerbates this dilemma by extending the duty of a psychia-
trist to protect identifiable victims to include a duty to protect
the public at large. Ultimately, this dilemma exposes the dis-
parity between the goals of the mental health and legal com-
munities: fostering of individual freedom' by safeguarding
against unfounded use of the civil commitment process, and
protecting the public. Unless the law of Petersen and social
policy are reconciled, legislative mandate 9 underlying the
State's civil commitment process will be rendered impotent.
This is in spite of the Washington legislature's recent attempt
to limit Petersen by amending the relevant mental health
laws.1" There is reason to believe, however, that this new legis-
6. For the purpose of this paper, "psychiatrist" refers to those professionals who
can initiate involuntary civil commitment proceedings, or who are responsible for the
treatment, care, release, or other disposition of an individual who has entered a state's
involuntary civil commitment system. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(13) (1987).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 43-48 & 65-68.
8. Although Petersen does not explicitly focus on fostering individual freedom, it
implicitly does so by discussing Washington's Involuntary Treatment Act (ITA)
throughout the case. Petersen, 100 Wash. 2d at 429, 430, 441, 671 P.2d at 238, 239, 244.
Thus, in analyzing any part of the ITA, as well as Petersen, one must keep in mind the
prefatory intent to "safeguard individual rights." See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.05.360,
.370, .380 (1987).
9. The intent of the ITA was specifically enunciated by the legislature as follows:
1) To end inappropriate, indefinite commitment of mentally disordered
persons and to eliminate legal disabilities that arise from such
commitment;
2) To provide prompt evaluation and short-term treatment of persons with
serious mental disorders;
3) To safeguard individual rights;
4) To provide continuity of care for persons with serious mental disorders;
5) To encourage the full use of all existing agencies, professional personnel,
and public funds to prevent duplication of services and unnecessary
expenditures;
6) To encourage, whenever appropriate, that services be provided within the
community.
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.010 (1987).
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.120(2) (1987) (amending WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.120
(1985)). Following substantial changes in 1986 to Washington tort law, a variety of
constituencies perceived that the result of Petersen required further adjustments to
the law. The chief concern of mental health professionals was that the duties imposed
by Petersen left them vulnerable to greater liability and that the effect of this would
lead to the dismantling of the mental health community. The primary groups involved
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lation will do nothing to cure the effect of Petersen, or to
resolve the psychiatrists' conflict of duties. Thus, the result
will be unnecessarily increased use by psychiatrists of their
authority to involuntarily commit, a lessening of personal lib-
erty rights, and a growing and overburdened civil commitment
system."
This Article argues that the duty of psychiatrists to pro-
tect, as articulated by the Petersen court and left unchanged by
the Washington legislature, should be imposed only in speci-
fied circumstances. Such circumstances include situations
where the psychiatrist has actual knowledge12 of a patient's
dangerousness, or where a notice or warning can be made to an
identifiable victim. When those circumstances are not present,
however, there is no justification for placing a psychiatrist in
the dilemma of having to choose confinement over risk. 3
Part I of this Article traces the development and expan-
sion of tort rules governing psychiatric liability and the mental
health field. Part II briefly examines the concept of involun-
tary civil commitment, generally, and in Washington. Part III
presents a factual overview and analysis of Petersen v. State,
followed by a criticism of the court's decision and legislative
response.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION OF TORT RULES
A. Common Law Origins of the Duty to Protect
At common law, there was no duty to control the conduct
of another or to protect those who were endangered by
with amending the law were the Washington State Trial Lawyers and the Liability
Reform Coalition. Telephone conversations with Dick Armstrong, Staff Counsel,
Senate Judiciary Committee; Clifford Webster, lobbyist for the Washington State
Medical Association, and a member of the Liability Reform Coalition (January 1988).
See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
11. For an excellent review on the impact resulting from the expanding civil
commitment power of the state on a state's mental health policy, see Durham and
LaFond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of Broadening the
Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 395 (1985)
[hereinafter Durham and La Fond].
12. See infra notes 131 & 147 and accompanying text.
13. See generally Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing the Psychotherapists to
Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1976); Special Project, Where the Public
Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31
STAN. L. REV. 165 (1978); Mills, The So-Called Duty to Warn: The Psychotherapeutic
Duty to Protect Third Parties From Patients' Violent Acts, 2 BEHAV. SC. & LAw 237
(1984).
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another's conduct.1 4 This rule of no duty to control or protect
originated in the common law distinction between action and
inaction, or "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance."15 The common
law provided that one who injured another by a positive,
affirmative act was held liable, while one who did nothing
escaped liability, despite the harm resulting from inaction.
1 6
Exceptions to this rule were made, however, when some
type of special relationship existed between the person whose
conduct posed the harm and the person threatened. 7 Thus
innkeepers were held to have an obligation toward their
guests,1 8 employers toward their employees, 9 schools toward
their pupils,2" and businesses toward their customers.21 The
duty imposed was one of reasonable care under the circum-
stances; it did not require a party to take action until the party
knew, or had reason to know a person was threatened.22
14. The Restatement of Torts reflects the general rule of nonliability: "The fact
that the actor realizes or should realize that the action on his part is necessary for
another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such
action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 315 (1965).
15. Id. § 314 comment c (1965).
16. The rule owes its survival to "the difficulties of setting any standards of
unselfish service to fellow men, and of making any workable rule to cover possible
situations where fifty people might fail to rescue .... W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE
LAW OF TORTS 376 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
17. Because practical difficulties exist in distinguishing the actor and non-actor,
the courts have increased the number of instances in which an affirmative duty is
imposed. They have done this, not by the direct rejection of the common law rule, but
by expanding the list of special relationships which justify departure from the common
law rule. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 16, at 356-85. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(a), (b) (1965).
18. Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, 5 Ill. App. 2d 327, 125 N.E.2d 544 (1955) (action by
guest against hotel for injuries resulting from assault by intruder in guest's room).
19. Taylor v. Slaughter, 171 Okl. 152, 42 P.2d 235 (1935) (duty of sheriff to prisoner
for injuries sustained if sheriff and his deputies, or jailer in sheriff's employment, were
aware of contemplated assault on prisoner and did not use reasonable means to
prevent it).
20. Shultz v. Gould Academy, 332 A.2d 368 (Me. 1975) (negligence action against
boarding school for failure to protect student from intruder into his dormitory room).
21. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Johnstoneaux, 395 So.2d 599 (Fla. App. 1981) (action
against supermarket for injuries sustained by customer robbed by unknown assailant
in common parking lot of shopping center; extensive evidence indicated many attacks
in this high crime district).
22. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A:
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable
action
(a) To protect them against unreasonable risks, physical harm, and
(b) To give them first-aid after it knows or has reason to know that they
are ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by
others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
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Case law and statutes gradually extended the special rela-
tionship exception to include the duty to control the conduct of
third persons when a special relationship existed between the
actor and the third person. The duty arose when an individual
had control or custody of another, and knew, or had reason to
know of the possibility of harm to other parties. 23 For exam-
ple, courts imposed upon parents a duty to protect a babysitter
by warning of their child's violent propensities; likewise, the
state, to discharge its duty to protect, must warn guardians of a
ward's dangerous tendencies. 24 The courts have extended this
duty and imposed liability even where there was no relation-
ship between the actor and the person threatened.25
The physician-patient relationship was a natural area for
extending the duty to protect. Thus, a physician has an affirm-
ative duty to protect third parties from dangers created by
their patient.2' The basis for this duty is the special relation-
ship between the physician and patient which consists of the
doctor's right of custody over the patient,27 and of the profes-
sional knowledge gained in treating or evaluating a patient. 21
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty
to members of the public who enter in response to the invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody
of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal
opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to the other.
23. Id. § 315 comment a (1965).
24. Other duties traditionally include the duty of a parent to control a child's
conduct, the duty of a master to control a servant's conduct, a landholder's duty to
control the conduct of a licensee, the duty of those charged with the custody of persons
with dangerous propensities, and the duty of a custodian to control the conduct of
another. See id. §§ 316, 317, 318, 319, and 320; Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310,
253 P.2d 675 (1953). See also Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess, 90 Wash. 2d 402, 583 P.2d 626
(1978) (parents liable for the tortious conduct of their children if parents know of the
child's dangerous proclivity and fail to take reasonable measures to control those
proclivities; state agency designated to care for children held to same standard.).
25. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968) (state
liable for parole officer's negligence in failing to warn foster parent of child's
dangerousness). See Christensen v. Murphy, 296 Or. 610, 678 P.2d 1210 (1984) (public
safety officer can recover damages for personal injuries sustained in course of
employment as result of defendant's negligence).
26. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551
P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
27. Section 319 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS reflects the general rule
of liability for physicians and hospitals: "One who takes charge of a third person
whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not
controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to
prevent him from doing such harm."
28. See Harper and Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE
L.J. 886, 897 (1934).
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Ample precedent now exists in which the special relationship
has been used to impose liability on doctors and health-care
institutions.29
In light of the relationship that develops between doctor
and patient, and the status society attributes to health care
professionals, 30 it is no surprise that most courts have extended
the duty to protect to psychiatrists. With their superior knowl-
edge, psychiatrists are expected to identify individuals who are
dangerous to themselves or others and to recommend preven-
tive action.31 This occurs both in the mental health context
and within the judicial system where psychiatrists are called
upon to assist in making decisions about culpability, compe-
tence, incarceration, or rehabilitation.32
B. Development of the Psychiatrist's Duty to Protect
The duty of a psychiatrist to protect others from a
patient's dangerousness was first articulated in Tarasoff v.
Regents of California.33 The parents of a woman brought suit
against the University of California when their daughter was
killed by a patient under the care of a psychologist employed
by the University. The patient had told the psychologist that
he was going to kill a girl. 4 Although she was unnamed, the
Tarasoffs' daughter was readily identifiable as the victim.
3 5
The psychologist gave no warning to the victim or her family. 6
29. See, e.g., Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1976); Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 296 S.E.2d 693 (1982); Gooden v.
Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App. 1983). This duty is most apparent when the doctor
treats a patient with a contagious disease. Liability can be imposed due to a failure to
diagnose or warn of the disease. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 comment a,
illustrations 1, 2 (1965).
30. See generally 61 AM. JUR. 2D, Physicians and Surgeons, § 246 (1981).
31. Persons within the profession have long recognized that psychiatrists occupy a
privileged position within society. For a discussion of the power and status afforded
psychiatrists, see T. SZASz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 79-80 (1980); S. HALLECK,
THE POLITICS OF THERAPY 99-117 (1971).
32. See Fleming and Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's
Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (1974) [hereinafter Fleming and Maximov]
("[H]ospitals and medical sciences are charged with a public interest. Their image of
responsibility in our society makes them prime candidates for converting their moral
duties into legal ones.").
33. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 324, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
34. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 433, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21. The psychologist conferred with
two University psychiatrists, and all three concurred in the need to commit the
patient. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21. This need was communicated
to the University police orally and in writing. Id. However, the director of the
[Vol. 11:255
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The victim's parents sued the psychologist and the Univer-
sity alleging the failure to exercise reasonable care in protect-
ing their daughter.37 This alleged breach of the psychiatrist's
duty to protect resulted from both the University's failure to
commit the patient and the failure to provide any warning to
the victim.
38
In holding that a duty to protect existed under the circum-
stances, the court applied an exception to the common law rule
that one person owed no duty to control the conduct of
another. 9 The court found that an exception to the common
law rule exists in cases when the defendant stands in some
special relationship to either the person whose conduct needs
to be controlled, or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim 40
of that conduct. 41 Thus, it was the nature of the relationship
between the physician and patient that created the duty owed
by the therapist to a third party.42
In enunciating this duty to protect, the Tarasoff court rec-
ognized the existence of a conflict in public policy. First, there
was an important public interest in supporting effective treat-
ment of mental illness, protecting the rights of patients' pri-
vacy, and safeguarding the confidential character of the
psychotherapists' communications.43 Second, there was an
psychology department countermanded the order to seek confinement and directed
that copies of the letter to the police and the psychologist's notes be destroyed. Id.
37. Id. at 433, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23. See supra notes 14-16 and
accompanying text.
40. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23. The
foreseeability of harm in Tarasoff was apparent from the directive of the chief
psychiatrist to destroy all records of the therapist. The court ruled that records were
not privileged because the interest of the protection of the victim outweighed the
interest of the confidentiality of the patient. Id. at 439 n.12, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 26.
41. Thus, a relationship of a therapist to either the victim or the perpetrator will
suffice to establish a duty of care. Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
42. Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26. One commentator asserts that
the Tarasoff court, originally asked to choose between a duty to warn and a duty to
confine, in reality, opted for a third and more ambiguous choice, a duty to protect. A.
STONE, The Tarasoff Case and Some of Its Progeny, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND
MORALITY 161 (1984) [hereinafter STONE]. Avoiding a position which would favor civil
commitment, Tarasoff tells the psychiatrist that he must protect third parties, but
does not specify what steps are legally necessary and sufficient to meet this obligation.
Id. Stone notes that subsequent judicial decisions have failed to recognize this
distinction and the law, as interpreted, stands for the broad duty to protect, rather
than the narrow duty to warn, and creates a greater risk of psychiatric liability. Id.
43. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 440, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
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important public interest in protecting society by warning of
impending violence." The court balanced these countervailing
concerns by relying on the state's evidence code,45 which pro-
vides a limited exception to the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege, allowing disclosure of communication necessary to protect
third parties from a patient's dangerousness.4 6 Thus, the court
found that the need to protect the public from dangerous
behavior far outweighed the psychotherapist-patient privilege
or confidentiality. 47 The court finally concluded that "the pub-
lic policy favoring protection of the confidential character of
the patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the
extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to
others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril
begins.
48
In Mavroudis v. Superior Court,49 another California case,
the court attempted to clarify when one public policy concern
outweighed the other. In Mavroudis, the plaintiffs' son, while
receiving psychiatric treatment, attacked his parents and
caused them personal injuries. The lower court had denied the
parents' motion to compel production of their son's psychiatric
records because of its interpretation of Tarasoff as limiting a
therapist's duty to protect by warning when he has actual
knowledge of the danger, or where the danger is present
toward particular individuals.5 0
The appellate court stated that actual knowledge of a
patient's dangerousness and knowledge of the identity of the
intended victim were not prerequisites to imposing liability on
a therapist for a failure to warn.5 ' The court held that
44. Id.
45. Id. at 440-41, 551 P.2d at 346-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.
46. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966) provides in part: "There is no privilege...
if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such
mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to ... another and that
disclosure ... is necessary to prevent the threatened danger."
47. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
48. Id.
49. 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1980).
50. Id. at 599, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
51. The Mavroudis court makes clear that the intended victim need not be
specifically named by the patient, but must be "readily identifiable." Id. at 600, 162
Cal. Rptr. at 729. The Tarasoff court indicated what it meant by "readily identifiable"
in a footnote in which it recognized that it would be unreasonable to require the
therapist to interrogate the patient or to conduct an independent investigation to
discover identity of the patient's intended victim. On the other hand, the Tarasoff
court stated that there are cases in which a "moment's reflection" will reveal the
victim's identity. In such cases, the Tarasoff court indicated that the therapist had a
[Vol. 11:255
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Tarasoff imposes a duty to protect whenever a therapist deter-
mines, or pursuant to the standards of the profession should
have determined, that the patient presents a serious threat of
violence to others.52 Thus, where the victim's identity will be
revealed in a "moment's reflection," the duty to protect
exists.53
In recent years courts have subjected psychiatrists and
other mental health professionals to increased judicial scru-
tiny, fostering the social policy of protecting public safety.'
The rationale for imposing this duty to protect is based in tort
law and on the notion that those with special powers and skills
are obligated to act in the community's best interests.
II. INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT
As noted in the previous discussion, the psychiatrist's posi-
tion of knowledge, power, and control has been the underlying
rationale for imposing a duty to protect society from dangerous
individuals. That duty can be discharged in a variety of ways,
and will often take the form of warning potential victims or
detaining a patient for a period of care or treatment. The most
duty to protect that person from the danger presented by his patient. Id. (citing
Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439 n.11, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.).
52. Mavroudis, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 599-600, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
53. The Tarasoff court recognized the difficulty encountered by therapists in
attempting to forecast whether a patient presents a serious danger of violence:
"Obviously we do not require that the therapist, in making that determination, render
a perfect performance; the therapist need only exercise that reasonable degree of skill,
knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of [that
professional specialty] under similar circumstances." 17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 345,
131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (citations omitted). For a review of other jurisdictions following
the California rule, see McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979)
(psychiatrist has a duty to "protect an intended victim or potential victim when he
determines, or should determine.... that the patient is or may present a probability of
danger to that person."); Chrite v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Mich. 1983)
(United States held liable for failing to warn victim of dangerous propensities of
Veterans Administration Hospital patient). See also Underwood v. United States, 356
F.2d 92 (5th cir. 1966) (liability imposed upon a psychiatrist for the harm to a third
party caused by the negligent release of a patient from psychiatric custody).
54. This is obvious in view of the ever-expanding imposition of liability. See
Semler v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D.C., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976) (institution failed to contact the court about a patient-
probationer's change in treatment plan); Pangburn v. Saad, 73 N.C. App. 336, 326
S.E.2d 365 (1985) (claim of negligence sustained even when the intended victim had
knowledge of the patient's dangerous propensities because a psychiatrist released his
patient in spite of objections made by the patient's family); see also Hicks v. United
States, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (hospital negligent in failing to inform court of
necessary details of patient's mental condition that resulted in patient's wife's death).
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effective mechanism afforded the psychiatrist to discharge this
duty, however, is to recommend involuntary civil
commitment.55
Underlying civil commitment of the mentally ill are the
theories of the state's police power and parens patriae.56
Under its police power,57 the state may exercise its authority to
enact laws to protect the health, welfare, and safety of the
community at large. Similarly, under the protective authority
of parens patriae,58 a state is empowered to act on behalf of
others who lack the capacity to act in their own best interests.
In all 50 states and the District of Columbia, an individual
may be civilly committed, against his will, to a mental institu-
tion.59 To justify involuntary hospitalization, some showing of
the existence of a mental disorder is universally required.6"
Both emergency and non-emergency state commitment stat-
utes contain the standards governing involuntary civil commit-
ment.61  Although a review of states' standards for
commitment suggests different thresholds for hospitalization,
commitment is generally restricted to mentally ill persons who
appear dangerous to themselves or others, or to those to whom
a threat of harm is immediate.62
55. In this article, "involuntary civil commitment" or "civil commitment" refers to
any state-imposed, compulsory hospitalization, confinement, or other restriction of
personal liberty premised on an individual's mental illness. See WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 71.05.030, .040 (1987).
56. For a thorough discussion of these theories, see La Fond, An Examination of
the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 499 (1981)
[hereinafter La Fond].
57. The state's police power to commit persons who may be of danger to
themselves or to others has its roots in common law. See La Fond, supra note 56, at
501. Theoretically, a person committed pursuant to the police power of the state can
remain in confinement until he is no longer dangerous to himself or others. Id.
58. This power, recognized in English Common Law, is used to exercise
commitment authority over persons with a variety of mental disabilities. Most parens
patriae schemes authorize involuntary commitment of mentally ill persons who cannot
care for themselves, are unable to seek appropriate treatment, or are gravely disabled.
Id. at 504-06.
59. Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1190, 1202, 1202 n.3 (1974) [hereinafter Developments - Civil Commitment].
60. Id. at 1202 n.4.
61. For an overview of civil commitment statutes, see id. at 1202 & n.2; see also
Beis, State Involuntary Commitment Statutes, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 358-69
No. 4 (1983).
62. Developments - Civil Commitment, supra note 59, at 1203-05. See, e.g., WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 71.05.150 (1)(b), 71.05.020(1), (2), (3) (1987), which provide that a person
may be involuntarily committed, if as a result of mental disorder, the person presents
a likelihood of serious harm to others or himself, or is gravely disabled. See infra note
70. See also ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.700 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-526 (1986);
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Current procedural provisions for commitment vary from
state to state and range from judicial hearings to discretionary
administrative proceedings.6 3 Generally, involuntary commit-
ment is initiated in an emergency by a police officer or by a
mental health professional.6 4
A psychiatrist's use of involuntary civil commitment of a
dangerous person may ensure public safety and obviate the
necessity of warning. However, this type of detainment threat-
ens important liberty interests of the patient such as privacy,
violation of due process, and loss to the patient of expected
treatment.6 5 State legislatures have responded to this clash of
interests by limiting involuntary civil commitment to specified
circumstances.6 6 For example, state intervention is generally
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1406 (Supp. 1985); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West. 1984);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 27-10-105 (Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-183 (West
Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 5122 (Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.463
(West 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-59 (1985 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 66-326
(Supp. 1987); ILL. REV. STATE. ch. 91 1/2, § 3-601 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-9.1-3
(Burns Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.22 (West 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2908
(1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (Bobbs-Merrill 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 28:53 (West Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. ANN. CODE § 10-622 (Michie 1982 & Supp.
1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 12 (West Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 330.1427 (West Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253.05 (West Supp. 1988); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 41-21-71 (1972 & Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-129 (1987); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 83-1020, 1021 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.160 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 135-C: 27 (Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-26.3 (West 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-
1-10 (Supp. 1984); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39 (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-261 (Michie 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-25 (Smith Supp. 1987); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.10 (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 426.175,
.215 (Butterworth 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7301, 7302 (Purdon Supp. 1987); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-17-410 (Law. Co-op 1976 & Supp. 1987)); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 27A-10-3 (Smith 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-103, 104 (Michie Supp. 1987); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-28 (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-34
(Michie 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7504, 7505 (Equity Supp. 1986); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 51.15 (West 1987); WYO. STAT. § 25-10-109 (Michie Supp. 1987).
63. Developments - Civil Commitment, supra note 59, at 1265.
64. For example, see WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150 (1)(a) (1987), which provides
for the initiation of the process when a county mental health professional, after
interviewing an individual, determines that the individual is in need of treatment or
evaluation at a mental health facility.
65. See Fleming and Maximov, supra note 32, at 1049, 1051. This conflict of
interest, or "dilemma," could be resolved by improving diagnostic methods and
therapeutic skills, guarding the timing of disclosure, selecting a form of intervention
with the least harmful impact upon the patient's interest, and utilizing the procedures
of informed consent. Id. at 1065-66.
66. ALA. CODE § 22-5291, 10 (Supp. 1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-501-520
(West 1986); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17-176, 183 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-501-504.2 (Harrison 1986 & Supp.
1987); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 334-59, 60 (1985 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 66-317,
329 (Supp. 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 1-119, 3-700, -706 (Smith-Hurd 1987); IND.
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limited to committing only those patients who are dangerous to
themselves, or others, as manifested by recent conduct. And
although the use of a "dangerousness" standard has generated
great debate by courts and commentators alike,67 recent
reform in civil commitment laws has signaled to psychiatrists
that commitment may not occur without a sufficiently strong
governmental interest.
6
In Washington, for example, the Involuntary Treatment
Act69 (ITA) allows commitment of people who are either
"gravely disabled" or present a "likelihood of serious harm."7
CODE ANN. § 16-14-9.1-1 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983 & Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 229.11 (West 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2908, -2909 (Supp. 1987); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 202A.026, (Michie 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 386 2-3863 (West
Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 10-6 20 to 632 (Michie 1982 & Supp.
1987); MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 12 (West Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 330.1401 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.05 (West Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 53-21-102, -129 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-1009, -1020, -1037 (1981); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 433A.160, .170-.310, (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-C: 27 to 33
(Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30: 4-23, -25, -26.3 (West 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-
1-10 (Supp. 1984); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.37, 9.39, 9.41, 9.43 (McKinney 1978 &
Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-262 to 293 (Michie 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-
03.1-02, 09 (Smith Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 5 (West Supp. 1988); OR.
REV. STAT. § 426.175 (Butterworth 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7301, 7302, 7303
(Purdon Supp.'1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 27A-10-1 to 27A-10-9 (Smith 1984);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-103 (Michie Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36 (Michie
1986 & Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7101, 7504 (Equity Supp. 1986); W. VA.
CODE § 27-5-2 (Michie 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.15, 51.20 (West 1987); WYO. STAT.
§ 25-10-110 (Michie 1982). For a discussion of the limitation of coercive interaction by
the state, see La Fond, supra note 56.
67. See, e.g., Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Lynch v.
Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 654 P.2d 109
(1982); Groethe, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for
Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 562 (1977)
[hereinafter Groethe, Overt Dangerous Behavior].
68. In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the Supreme Court specifically
addressed the constitutionality of involuntary civil commitment outside of the criminal
context. In its decision, it articulated a state interest standard, holding the involuntary
civil commitment of the mentally ill impermissible when insufficient state interest is
present. See also Groethe, Overt Dangerous Behavior, supra note 67, at 563-69.
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.015 (1987).
70. "Gravely disabled" means a condition in which a person, as a result of a
mental disorder: (a) Is in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a
failure to provide for his essentially human needs of health or safety, or
(b) manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by
repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his actions
and is not receiving such care as is needed for his or her health or safety.
Id. § 71.05.020(1).
"Likelihood of serious harm" means either: (a) A substantial risk that
physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon his own person, as evi-
denced by threats or attempts to commit suicide or inflict harm on one's self,
(b) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual
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The involuntary commitment process is initiated when a
mental health professional71 receives information alleging that
a person presents an imminent likelihood of serious danger to
himself or others, or is in imminent danger because of being
gravely disabled.72 The mental health professional must thor-
oughly evaluate information received and assess the "reliabil-
ity and credibility" of the person providing the information. 3
The initial detention of an individual may not exceed a 72-hour
evaluation period.74
Once admitted to an evaluation and treatment facility,75 an
individual must be examined within 24 hours by a licensed
physician and mental health professional. 76  Following the
examination, an individual receives the treatment and care
required by his condition, and beginning 24 hours prior to a
court proceeding, the individual may refuse all but emergency
life-saving treatment.77
Persons who meet the criteria for further commitment
during this period can be held for not more than 14 additional
days.71 Washington law also provides that prior to each invol-
untary civil commitment order, other less restrictive alterna-
upon another, as evidenced by behavior which has caused such harm or which
places another person or persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such harm,
or (c) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual
upon the property of others, as evidenced by behavior which has caused sub-
stantial loss or damage to the property of others ....
Id. § 71.05.020(3).
71. Mental health professional means "a psychiatrist, psychologist, psychiatric
nurse, or social worker, and such other mental health professionals as may be defined
by rules and regulations .... Id. § 71.05.020(11).
72. See, e.g., In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 284-85, 654 P.2d 109, 112-13 (1982)
(WASH. REV. CODE ch. "71.05's standard of dangerousness provides a valid basis for the
involuntary commitment of an individual. The risk of danger must be substantial and
the harm must be serious before detention is justified.").
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150(1) (1987).
74. Id. § 71.05.180. At this time, an individual is released or provided a probable
cause hearing. Id. §§ 71.05.180, .240.
75. An "evaluation and treatment facility" is a mental health facility which
provides directly, or by direct arrangement with other public or private agencies,
emergency evaluation and treatment, outpatient care, and short-term inpatient care to
persons suffering from a mental disorder, and which is certified by the State
Department of Social and Health Services. Id. § 71.05.020 (16).
76. Id. § 71.05.210.
77. Id. The law requires that an individual must also be informed of his right to
refuse such treatment. Id.
78. Id. § 71.05.230. Requirements for further detention are that the individual's
condition is caused by a mental disorder and results either in a likelihood of serious
harm to others, or in an individual being gravely disabled and that the individual has
not in good faith volunteered for additional treatment.
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tives to voluntary or involuntary detention must be
examined. 9  If commitment is ordered, each individual is
afforded the "right to adequate care and individualized
treatment."80
Additional confinements for up to 90 days8 ' can be
imposed if an individual threatens, attempts, or inflicts harm
upon another or himself and thus presents a likelihood of seri-
ous harm to himself or others.8 2 At the end of this period, an
individual is released unless he meets criteria for further con-
finement for up to 180 days. 83 The 180-day periods of detention
can be renewed indefinitely provided a full hearing8 4 is held
prior to each renewal.8 5
The objectives86 of Washington law are progressive and
safeguard the liberty interests of mental patients.8 7 As is clear
from its prefatory language, the ITA addresses the protection
of a patient's rights against wrongful or indefinite commit-
ment. To this end, the law articulates standards to end inap-
propriate commitment, to hasten patient evaluation, to
shorten, when appropriate, treatment and hospitalization, and
to encourage the use of community services.
These and other safeguards present in the ITA, dedicated
to protecting individual rights, conflict with society's expecta-
tion of protection by psychiatrists from patient dangerousness.
And the continual debate in medical and legal literature
79. Id. § 71.05.230(4).
80. Id. § 71.05.360.
81. Id. § 71.05.320.
82. Id. § 71.05.280(1).
83. Id. § 71.05.320(2)(d).
84. Id. Procedural due process rights include written and oral notice of the nature
of the hearing, as well as the right to (1) communicate with counsel immediately upon
detention, (2) remain silent, (3) be represented by counsel at the hearing, (4) present
evidence and cross-examine witnesses, (5) have the hearing governed by evidence
rules, (6) view and copy contents of the court file. See id. §§ 71.05.150, .230, .240, .250,
.310.
85. Id. §§ 71.05.180, .240.
86. The Washington legislature has clearly set out the objectives of its involuntary
civil commitment law, which are carefully designed to ensure the protection of a
mental patient's rights against wrongful or indefinite commitment. Id. § 71.05.010. See
supra note 9.
87. One of the most important decisions which has influenced protection of
patients' rights is Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and
remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976).
In this case, the court articulated standards for procedural due process which have
been followed by many courts and legislatures throughout the country.
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regarding the duty of a psychiatrist to third parties virtually
assures that this conflict of interest is far from resolved.
This conflict is especially stark in situations where there is
no victim to be warned and where a patient's behavior does not
warrant confinement under the restrictive standards of the
law. Such a situation came before the Washington Supreme
Court in Petersen v. State.8s
III. PETERSEN V. STATE
A. Facts
In May 1977, Larry Knox injured Cynthia Petersen in an
automobile collision when Knox, under the influence of drugs,
struck her car. 9 At the time of the accident, Knox was on pro-
bation for a burglary conviction, which required his participa-
tion in mental health counseling and required that he not use
controlled substances.9"
In April 1977, a month before the automobile collision,
Knox removed his left testicle and was subsequently hospital-
ized.91 Dr. Alva Miller, Knox's physician at the hospital,92
learned that Knox took angel dust 93 prior to emasculating him-
self. Dr. Miller diagnosed Knox as having a schizophrenic
reaction primarily due to the use of angel dust.94 Dr. Miller
prescribed Navane, an antipsychotic medication.95
On April 22, 1977, Dr. Miller and a psychiatric nurse filed
88. 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983).
89. Id. at 422-23, 671 P.2d at 234.
90. Id. at 423, 671 P.2d at 234.
91. Id.; Knox was involuntarily detained at Western State Hospital pursuant to
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.050.150, .180 (1987).
92. Dr. Miller was Clinical Director of Western State Hospital. Petersen, 100
Wash. 2d at 423, 671 P.2d at 235. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020 (1987), which
provides in part:
(11) "Mental health professional" means a psychiatrist, psychologist,
psychiatric nurse, or social worker, and such other mental health
professionals as may be defined by rules and regulations adopted by the
secretary pursuant to the provisions of this chapter;
(12) "Professional person" shall mean a mental health professional, as
above defined, and shall also mean a physician, registered nurse, and such
others as may be defined by rules and regulations adopted by the secretary
pursuant to the provisions of this chapter....
93. Angel dust is the street name for phencyclidine hydrochloride, or "PCP."
PCP is used in veterinary medicine as a horse tranquilizer. SLOANE-DORLAND
ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 545 (1987). "Abuse of [PCP] may lead to
serious psychological disturbances." Id.
94. Petersen, 100 Wash. 2d at 423, 671 P.2d at 235.
95. Id.
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a petition requesting authority to further detain Knox.9 6 They
maintained that Knox was gravely disabled97 because of his
drug abuse, that Knox presented a likelihood of harm to him-
self,98 and that he was not ready for less restrictive care.99 The
court found that Knox was gravely disabled and ordered that
Knox be detained for another 14 days.100
By the first week of May 1977, Knox showed no further
signs of drug-related problems.' On May 8, 1977, Knox was
allowed to go home on a day pass. That evening he returned to
the hospital driving his car "in a reckless fashion that involved
spinning his car in circles."'1 2 The next day, Dr. Miller dis-
charged Knox from the hospital. Dr. Miller believed Knox had
recovered from the drug reaction and was fully in "contact
with reality.'
10 3
On May 14, 1977, the automobile accident involving
Cynthia Petersen occurred. Knox was under the influence of
illegal drugs at the time and had not taken the medication pre-
scribed for him at the hospital.0 4
Cynthia Petersen alleged in her claim against the State
that it failed to protect her against Knox's dangerous propensi-
ties.105 She claimed that Dr. Miller's failure to seek additional
confinement was a proximate cause of her injuries.'0 6 The case
was allowed to go to the jury on this theory, and the jury
agreed. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court found that
the lower court's decision that Dr. Miller's conduct constituted
gross negligence was not reversible error.10 7 The court found
that Dr. Miller had a duty to protect the plaintiff from the
96. Id. at 424, 671 P.2d at 235.
97. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.210 (1987); see supra note 70.
98. 100 Wash. 2d at 424, 671 P.2d at 235; see supra note 70.
99. 100 Wash. 2d at 424, 67 P.2d at 235. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying
text.
100. 100 Wash. 2d at 424, 671 P.2d at 235.
101. Id.
102. Brief for Appellant at 15, Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 330
(1983) (No. 06021 3-Il).
103. 100 Wash. 2d at 424, 671 P.2d at 235.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. Apparently, Petersen believed that Knox's driving on hospital grounds as
he did demonstrated his dangerousness. This writer believes, however, that driving in
circles does not constitute dangerous conduct under Washington law.
107. Id. at 438, 671 P.2d at 242. Petersen additionally claimed that Dr. Miller's
failure to disclose information about Knox's parole violation caused her injury. The
court, however, found that Dr. Miller could not lawfully disclose such information.
This issue is not addressed in this article.
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dangerous propensities of his patient and that 'sufficient evi-
dence had been presented to the jury to find that the doctor's
action was a proximate cause of the injuries. 08
B. The Petersen Court's Decision
In Petersen, the court confronted the dilemma between
the affirmative duty of a psychiatrist to protect others from his
patient's dangerousness and the statutory duty of protecting a
patient's civil liberty under Washington's ITA. In balancing
these competing interests, the court, without dissent, tipped in
favor of public protection, and thus expanded psychiatric liabil-
ity in a new direction.
A close reading of Petersen, however, reveals that it lacks
adequate legal authority for the public policy it creates. In
addition, contrary to the legislature's intent to limit commit-
ment to those who are gravely disabled or dangerous, the law
as articulated by the court now places psychiatrists in the
untenable position of seeking confinement whether or not the
prerequisites to detainment have been met.
Specifically, the Petersen court held that there is a duty to
protect unidentifiable third-party victims of psychiatric
patients. This duty exists because of the "special relation-
ship"'0 9 between the psychiatrist and the patient, in which the
psychiatrist can foresee possible harm to a victim. The court
acknowledged that the question of whether such a duty exists
was an issue of first impression in Washington." 0
The court recognized Tarasoff, holding that the psychia-
trist has a duty "to take reasonable precautions to protect any-
one who might foreseeably be endangered" by the patient's
actions."' The court further relied upon Kaiser v. Suburban
Transp. System, 1 2 and upon Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,"3
for the exception to the general rule of nonliability." 4
The Petersen court, however, found it unnecessary to dis-
cuss any of the distinguishing issues present in these other
108. Id. at 436, 671 P.2d at 241.
109. Id. at 426, 671 P.2d at 236. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
110. Petersen, 100 Wash. 2d at 426, 671 P.2d at 236.
111. Id. at 427, 671 P.2d at 236-37.
112. 65 Wash. 2d 461, 398 P.2d 14, corrected in 401 P.2d 350 (1965).
113. 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
114. Under the common law, a person had no duty to prevent a third party from
causing physical injury to another. Petersen, 100 Wash. 2d at 426, 671 P.2d at 236
(citing Lipari, 497 F. Supp. 185). See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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cases before affirming the finding that the defendant breached
the duty to the plaintiff. The court's failure to address these
issues is fatal to its analysis and provides little guidance for
future decisions. The Petersen decision forces professionals to
abide by its precedent rather than to depend on their exper-
tise, skill, and knowledge, and unfortunately, the recent legis-
lative attempts to ameliorate this result will prove
ineffective. 15 Thus, society is faced with still unanswered pub-
lic policy questions: Should it advocate the psychiatrist's
increased use of the commitment process so that the public
may enjoy greater protection, or should it insist that the stated
purposes of Washington's civil commitment law be the guide-
line for protecting individual freedom and limiting circum-
stances for involuntary confinement?
C. Critique of the Court's Decision
As decided, Petersen emphasizes and contributes to the
dilemma faced by psychiatrists in the treatment of their
patients. This is due, in part, to the limited consideration the
Petersen court gave to the legislative restrictions contained in
Washington ITA that preclude detainment solely by reason of
drug impairment.'16 The exacerbation of the conflict can also
be attributed to the court's reliance on cases which, with one
exception, contain sound legal propositions, but are factually
distinguishable from Petersen.
While the cases relied upon by the Petersen court may pro-
vide the necessary foundation for imposing the duty to protect
on the psychiatrist, they do not support the expansion of this
duty to protect the public at large. Current Washington law is
therefore without adequate support for imposing a duty to pro-
tect society en masse. The court's analysis is further weakened
because the only facts shared by Petersen and cases relied upon
by the court are that the defendant was a treating physician
and the harm caused by the patient resulted from his mental
condition.
First, in Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys.," 7 unlike Peter-
115. See text accompanying notes 10 & 132-33.
116. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.040 (1987), which provides that persons
impaired by drug abuse shall not be detained or committed solely by reason of that
condition unless it causes grave disability or harm to self or others. When Knox was
discharged, Dr. Miller believed that he had recovered from his drug reaction and that
he was back to his usual behavior. Petersen, 100 Wash. 2d at 424, 671 P.2d at 235.
117. 65 Wash. 2d 461, 401 P.2d 350 (1965).
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sen, the patient whose act harmed another had neither a his-
tory of dangerousness to himself or others nor any type of
mental condition for which he was being treated. In Kaiser, no
question arose of predicting the patient's dangerousness based
upon his past behavior or mental condition."8 Further, unlike
Petersen, the physician's liability in Kaiser was predicated, not
upon his duty to protect the public, but upon his duty to
inform his patient, whom he knew to be a bus driver, of the
foreseeable side effects of the medication prescribed. This, of
course, was a simple application of precedent requiring full dis-
closure of the risks and consequences of medical treatment.
All that Kaiser added was a view that this duty extended also
to third parties who might foreseeably be injured by a doctor's
breach of his duty." 9
What is important to stress about Kaiser is that the duty to
the plaintiff was a duty that undeniably existed in the first
place. 2 ° The duty was established by the doctor's superior
knowledge of his patient's occupation and his medical condi-
tion, as well as the knowledge of the potential dangers of the
prescribed medication. If the doctor had fully informed his
patient of the probable consequences of the medication, the
doctor would have had no liability to any third party. This spe-
cific duty of full disclosure stands in contrast to the genera-
lized duty created in Petersen to protect third parties who
suffer injury as a result of a patient's medical condition. The
generalized duty created in Petersen is a duty independent and
beyond that of the physician's responsibility to inform his
patient of known medical risks or consequences of treatment.
Tarasoff also stands in sharp contrast to Petersen because
in Tarasoff it was possible to identify and warn the victim and
her parents. Tarasoff carefully narrowed the duty to protect
third parties to cases where the patient's victim was identifi-
able or could be identified in a "moment's reflection.' 2' The
118. The Kaiser plaintiff was injured while a passenger on a bus when the bus
driver lost consciousness and the bus struck a telephone pole. The driver's lapse of
consciousness was attributed to the side effects of a drug prescribed for the treatment
of a nasal condition. Id. at 462, 463, 401 P.2d at 352.
119. There was no contention that the passenger-plaintiff was not the foreseeable
victim of the bus driver's accident.
120. The doctor's duty to affirmatively act in Kaiser, established by his superior
knowledge of his patient's occupation and his medical condition, is in concert with the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315, 319 (1965); see supra note 27.
121. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439 n.11, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25. The
court acknowledged the unreasonableness of requiring a doctor to "interrogate" a
1988]
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Tarasoff court did not create a generalized duty on the part of
the psychiatrist to protect unidentifiable victims or the public
at large. Instead, the court imposed a rather minimal burden
on the doctor to contact the victim through parents, friends, or
mental health authorities.12 2  The carefully limited duty in
Tarasoff is markedly dissimilar to the broad duty of the care
created in Petersen. In Petersen, any kind of notification would
have been impractical and ineffective. Dr. Miller had neither
the ability nor the knowledge to protect Cynthia Petersen
from Knox's dangerous propensities.
Finally, in relying on Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,123 the
Petersen court fails to distinguish between the failure to detain
when a patient's dangerousness satisfies the requirement for
further confinement, and the release of a patient when the
patient no longer fits the criteria for further commitment.2 4
In doing so, the Petersen court ignored established precedent of
other jurisdictions where courts have refused to impose liabil-
ity because of statutory limitations in the commitment scheme.
Under Washington law, an individual impaired by drugs cannot
be detained for evaluation or treatment unless dangerous to
patient regarding a victim's identity, or to conduct an independent investigation. See
supra note 51 and accompanying text.
122. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20. See Thompson v. County of
Alemeda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980), where the California
Supreme Court refused to extend the Tarasoff duty to include county probation
officers. In Thompson, a juvenile offender released from confinement into the
temporary custody of his mother, killed the plaintiffs' son. Although the county knew
that the offender had stated that he would kill some nonidentifiable child in the
community, officials released him without warning police, parents, or the offender's
mother. The Thompson court argued that liability could only be imposed when "the
released offender posed a predictable threat of harm to a named or readily identifiable
victim .. " Id. at 759, 614 P.2d at 732, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The offender had made a
"generalized threat to a segment of the population," and not to a specific victim. Id. at
751, 614 P.2d at 733, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
123. 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
124. At least two jurisdictions have refused to impose liability on psychiatrists
because of statutory limitations in the commitment scheme. See Hasenei v. United
States, 541 F. Supp. 999 (D. Md. 1982); Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 608 F. Supp. 554
(D. Mass. 1985) cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 270 (1986). In Hasenei, the court, applying
Pennsylvania law, determined that the mental patient, who was released from an
outpatient clinic, could not have been involuntarily committed under the applicable
civil commitment statute, which required a "clear and present danger to self or
others." Hasenei, 541 F. Supp. at 1010. Gilmore involved a murder by an inmate on
work release. The Massachusetts court held that medical personnel of the state
mental institution were not negligent for failing to petition for civil commitment.
Citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 15 (e) (West Supp. 1985), the court stated that
because the statute merely authorized, but did not require the medical director to
petition for commitment, negligence was absent. Gilmore, 608 F. Supp. at 560.
Psychiatrist's Duty to Protect
himself or others.'25 When released from the hospital, Knox
exhibited normal behavior and demonstrated no dangerousness
toward himself or others. 26
A review of the facts also reveals that the element of cog-
nitive choice present in Lipari, is nonexistent in Petersen. In
Lipari, a previously hospitalized mental patient purchased a
shotgun, and shortly thereafter resumed participation in a psy-
chiatric day treatment program. After removing himself from
this treatment, against medical advice, the patient shot and
injured the plaintiffs. 127 Importantly, in Lipari it was the
patient's choice to remove himself from a psychiatric day care
treatment facility against medical advice. 2 ' In Petersen, Knox
neither requested further confinement when his treatment ter-
minated, nor did he remove himself from the treatment pro-
gram, as he was a full-time institutionalized patient. Further,
in Lipari the patient intentionally harmed the plaintiffs while
acting under a mental defect. Knox's acts, however, were
unintentional, notwithstanding the fact that he was under the
influence of drugs. 29
Perhaps the strongest argument for re-evaluating the
Petersen court's reliance on Lipari and for limiting its future
application is that the Lipari court had no precedent for its
generalized duty to protect except for the failure-to-warn cases
of Tarasoff and its progeny. 30 Although Lipari directly held
that a psychiatrist owes an affirmative duty to persons other
than the patient, it should have followed the Tarasoff line of
cases in limiting this duty to a duty to protect identifiable vic-
tims. Lipari and Petersen are both wrong in creating a genera-
lized duty to protect in a context of psychotherapy because
they fail to limit liability to circumstances when the victim is
"identifiable" or there is actual knowledge' 3' of the patient's
125. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.040 (1987).
126. Petersen, 100 Wash. 2d at 424, 671 P.2d at 235. Furthermore, Knox did not fit
the criteria as established in In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 654 P.2d 109 (1982). The
Harris court interpreted the dangerousness standard of WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020
(1987) to require "a showing of a substantial risk of physical harm as evidenced by a
recent, overt act." Id. at 284, 654 P.2d at 113.
127. Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 187.
128. Id.
129. Petersen, 100 Wash. 2d at 424, 671 P.2d at 235.
130. See supra note 53.
131. Decisions from other jurisdictions support this contention by rejecting Lipari.
See Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981), affid, 676 F.2d 686 (3d Cir.
1982); Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999 (D. Md. 1982). But see Sakuda v.
Kyodogumi Co., 555 F. Supp. 371 (D. Haw. 1983). See also Brady v. Hopper, 570 F.
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dangerousness. By extending the duty to circumstances where
there is no victim to be warned, Lipari and Petersen create a
new responsibility neither considered nor supported by earlier
case law.
Unfortunately, the recent legislative changes in Washing-
ton's mental health law enacted in response to Peterson sur-
prisingly endorse the court's holding regarding the duty of
psychiatrists and the standard of care. Although the law is
now broadened to grant limited immunity to the state, local
governmental entities, and to evaluation and treatment facili-
ties, 3 2 it does nothing to protect a mental health professional
or entity from liability for gross negligence for failing to detain
an individual when the victim, as in Peterson, is not identifi-
able. This is because the law, while codifying the Tarasoff rule
requiring that notice, warning, or precautions be given where a
patient communicates an actual threat of physical violence
against a "reasonably identifiable victim,"'1 33 retains a standard
Supp. 1333 (D. Col. 1983), affd., 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984). In Brady, the Colorado
court rejected the argument that the special therapist-patient relationship creates
duties which extend to "the world at large." 570 F. Supp. at 1338. In this case, brought
by three men seriously injured by John Hinckley in his presidential assassination
attempt, the court held that there was no relationship between the defendant
psychiatrist and plaintiffs to create a legal obligation from him to them. The decision
noted with favor the Tarasoff rule, where there are specific threats to specific victims,
and implicitly opted for the duty to warn identifiable victims. Id. See STONE, supra
note 42, at 172. See also infra note 147 and accompanying text.
132. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.120(1)(1987) (amending WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.05.120 (1985)) provides:
(1) No officer of a public or private agency, nor the superintendent,
professional person in charge, his professional designee, or attending staff of
any such agency, nor any public official performing functions necessary to the
administration of this chapter, nor peace officer responsible for detaining a
person pursuant to this chapter, nor any county designated mental health
professional, nor the state, a unit of local government, or an evaluation and
treatment facility shall be civilly or criminally liable for performing duties
pursuant to this chapter with regard to the decision of whether to admit,
release, or detain a person for evaluation and treatment: Provided, that such
duties were performed in good faith and without gross negligence.
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.120(2) (1987) (amending WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.05.120 (1985)) provides:
(2) This section does not relieve a person from giving the required notices
under RCW 71.05.330(2) or 71.05.340(1)(b), or the duty to warn or to take
reasonable precautions to provide protection from violent behavior where the
patient has communicated an actual threat of physical violence against a
reasonably identifiable victim or victims. The duty to warn or to take
reasonable precautions to provide protection from violent behavior is
discharged if reasonable efforts are made to communicate the threat to the
victim or victims and to law enforcement personnel.
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of gross negligence regarding the psychiatrist's duty to protect
where a victim is unidentified.
Thus, even under this new law, Peterson would be decided
in the same way. The Peterson court would never have had to
reach the Tarasoff-type duties because it found, notwithstand-
ing the fact that Cynthia Peterson was an unidentified victim,
the psychiatrist's conduct grossly negligent for failing to
detain. Psychiatrists should not be liable to unidentifiable
third parties, however, unless there is actual knowledge of a
patient's dangerousness. Imposing liability without actual
knowledge presupposes that psychiatrists have the ability to
predict dangerousness.
In Petersen, the court's extension of a duty to protect
beyond identifiable victims implicitly assumes that psychia-
trists possess the expertise to reliably 1 34 or validly 1 35 predict
dangerous behavior without knowledge thereof. By extending
the law, the court overlooked important countervailing policy
reasons for not further extending liability.
First, within the psychiatric field, serious doubt exists con-
cerning the expertise in predicting dangerous behavior. 3 6 Sev-
eral studies demonstrate that psychiatric predictions of
dangerousness are unreliable and do not accurately identify
134. Reliability, as used by Ennis and Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of
Expertise: Flipping the Coin in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974)
[hereinafter Ennis and Litwack, Presumption of Expertise], "refers to the probability
or frequency of agreement when two or more independent observers answer the same
question...." Id. at 697. One example they offer is as follows: "If representative pairs
of psychiatrists, interviewing a representative sample of prospective patients, usually
agree that each individual is or is not 'dangerous,' the judgment of 'dangerousness' is
said to be reliable." Id.
135. Validity refers to how accurate the judgments of psychiatrists are. Id.
136. Even in Tarasoff, the court raised concern about the psychotherapist's ability
to predict dangerousness. Justice Mosk, in a dissenting opinion, questions what
"standards of the profession" will govern the court's evaluation of the therapist's
performance of his duty to protect victims. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 451, 551 P.2d at 354,
131 Cal. Rptr. at 34 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Mosk points out in Tarasoff
that the California court had previously opined that psychiatric predictions about
future dangerousness were inherently unreliable. Id. at 452, 551 P.2d at 354, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 34 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d
306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975)). Mosk concludes in Tarasoff.
I would restructure the rule designed by the majority to eliminate all
reference to conformity to standards of the profession in predicting violence.
If a psychiatrist does in fact predict violence, then a duty to warn arises. The
majority's extension of that rule will take us from the world of reality into
the wonderland of clairvoyance.
17 Cal. 3d at 452, 551 P.2d at 354, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 34 (Mosk. J., concurring and dissent-
ing). See also STONE, supra note 42, at 169.
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potentially violent individuals.1 3 7 Empirical studies reveal that
psychiatrists consistently overpredict dangerous behavior
13 8
due to a lack of expertise139 or the fear of responsibility for the
negligent release of a violent individual. Second, psychiatric
literature generally reveals that most diagnoses do not accu-
rately describe actual symptoms exhibited by a patient, and
that little correlation exists between diagnosis and patterns of
actual behavior. 1 40  In sum, largely unchallenged societal
expectations about psychiatric expertise are misplaced.
Such findings of unreliability and lack of expertise are
echoed by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in a
report on the clinical aspects of violence.' 4 ' The APA's posi-
tion is that the ability of psychiatrists to predict dangerousness
is unsatisfactory and that the "ability of psychiatrists to relia-
137. See J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 19 (1981)
[hereinafter MONAHAN, CLINICAL PREDICTION] (The prediction of dangerousness "is
currently used to assist in making a wide variety of legal decisions, from civil
commitment to the imposition of the death penalty.").
138. See Dix, Expert Prediction Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Evidentiary
and Constitutional Considerations, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1981); Dix, Clinical
Evaluation of the "Dangerousness" of "Normal" Criminal Defendants, 66 VA. L. REV.
523, 532-44, (1980); Groethe, Overt Dangerous Behavior, supra note 67, at 583; Haddad,
Predicting the Supreme Court's Response to the Criticism of Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 64 NEB. L. REV. 215 (1985)
[hereinafter Haddad, Predictions of Dangerousness] (the highest rate of accurate
predictions of potential dangerousness was about 35 percent); Schwitzgebel, Prediction
of Dangerousness and its Implications for Treatment, in W. CURRAN, A. MCGARRY, &
C. PETTY, MODERN LEGAL MEDICINE PSYCHIATRY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 783 (1980);
Steadman & Cocozza, Psychiatry, Dangerousness, and the Repetitively Violent
Offender, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226, 229-31 (1978); Ennis & Litwack,
Presumption of Expertise, supra note 134; Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence Be
Predicted? 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 393 (1972).
139. Ennis and Litwack, Presumption of Expertise, supra note 134.
140. Haddad, Predictions of Dangerousness, supra note 138, at 222 (citing Ennis
and Litwack, Presumption of Expertise, supra note 134, at 709-10). See also Monahan,
The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory and
Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10, 10 (1984) ("Even in the best of circumstances-with
lengthy multidisciplinary evaluations on patients who had already manifested their
violent proclivities on several occasions-psychiatrists and psychologists seemed to be
wrong at least twice as often as they were right when they predicted violence."). Some
courts have responded to the uncertainty of psychiatric predictions by excluding
expert testimony of a prediction of future violence. See, e.g., People v. Martishaw, 29
Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982).
141. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT
INDIVIDUAL 30 (Task Force Rpt. No. 8, 1974) (hereinafter CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE
VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL]. Almost a decade later, the American Psychiatric Association
(APA), in an amicus brief for Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, reh'g denied, 464 U.S.
874 (1983), involving the death penalty, urged the Supreme Court to excise from all
trials psychiatric testimony on the prediction of future violent conduct. The Court
dismissed the APA's position, however, and upheld the death penalty.
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bly predict future violence remains unproved."' 42 The Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) follows the consensus of the APA,
and has proposed to exclude from criminal proceedings "expert
opinion stating a conclusion that a particular individual will or
will not engage in dangerous behavior in the future . ,,.4" In
adopting this position, the ABA relied expressly on the scien-
tific consensus that such predictions are simply impossible to
make.1
4 4
Despite the conclusions of the studies and reports,145 the
Petersen court nonetheless imposed liability on Dr. Miller for
Knox's release. The jury found gross negligence, even though
no information was available to the psychiatrist to predict that
Knox would cause harm to that plaintiff. Without such infor-
mation, there should not have been a question for the jury to
decide. 46 It is precisely because dangerousness is so difficult to
predict that liability should be imposed only where there is
actual knowledge of a patient's dangerousness."'
142. CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL, supra note 141, at 30.
143. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-3.9(b) (First Tent. Draft
1983). See also 1 J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
330-47 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter ZISKIN].
144. See, e.g., ZISKIN, supra note 143, at 330 (cited with approval in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-3.9, commentary at 7.107 (First Tent. Draft
1983)):
[Because of psychiatry's] failure to develop adequate systems of classification
of its data, its failure to develop tested and/or testable theories, hypotheses
and principles, its failure to use adequate scientific methods to validate its
conclusions, and its use of primarily subjective rather than objective methods
of investigation, it has failed to meet criteria ordinarily considered minimal
for status as a science. It has been demonstrated that psychiatry fails to meet
the legal criterion of acceptance as a science among the general scientific
community, or even within its own ranks, for that matter, and has not crossed
the line from the experimental to the demonstratable. It lacks generally
agreed upon principles and therefore cannot be considered beyond the
experimental stage.
145. The Petersen court was no doubt aware of reports and studies on the issue of
predicting dangerousness because such studies and reports and other commentary are
contained in Tarasoff upon which the court so heavily relies. And although the
Petersen court cites the work of Fleming and Maximov and Ennis and Litwack for
authority on determining a therapist's standard of care, the court fails to acknowledge
that these works also thoroughly discuss limited psychiatric expertise in predicting
violent behavior. Petersen, 100 Wash. 2d at 438, 671 P.2d at 242.
146. For a review of recent research on the prediction of violent conduct and
patient dangerousness, see Wettstein, The Prediction of Violent Behavior and the Duty
to Protect Third Parties, 2 BEHAN. SCI. & LAW 291 (1984); MONAHAN, CLINICAL
PREDICTION, supra note 137.
147. See, e.g., Hedlund v. Superior Court of Orange County, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669
P.2d 41, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1983). In Hedlund, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
psychologists had been told by their patient that he intended to harm the plaintiff.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Empirical evidence demonstrates that psychiatrists are as
yet unable to accurately predict dangerous behavior. More-
over, even when psychiatrists have the ability to predict such
dangerousness, they are not always able to identify potential
victims.
Despite the difficulty that experts encounter in attempting
to forecast whether a patient presents a serious danger of
harm, appropriate circumstances for imposing liability on a
psychiatrist do exist. They are 1) actual knowledge of danger-
ous conduct on the part of the patient, including the failure to
utilize commitment procedures when legally available, and
2) failure to warn an "identifiable" victim. In these limited
instances, speculation and error are greatly diminished. Fur-
ther, the choice to act protectively or defensively, at the risk of
limiting a patient's liberty interests, is one more easily made
when the victim is identifiable. Under these standards, conjec-
ture and discretion all but disappear; if a psychiatrist predicts
violence, the duty to protect arises.
Deference to the Petersen form of utilitarian justice will
undoubtedly serve to compensate other plaintiffs, similar to
Cynthia Petersen, from the deep pocket of the state. Adhering
to the law of Petersen, which imposes a broad duty of due care
on psychiatrists to the public at large, however, creates
problems not yet contemplated by the courts. With Petersen,
the risk of over-using the involuntary civil commitment pro-
Despite the fact that defendants knew of their patient's threats, the court declined to
limit their holding to actual knowledge of dangerousness.
The court held the defendants liable, stating that they "should have known" that
the patient posed a danger to the plaintiff. Id. at 700, 669 P.2d at 43, 194 Cal. Rptr. at
807. In his dissent, Justice Mosk argues that the appropriate standard should be actual
knowledge of dangerousness:
Thus it can be argued that defendants had actual knowledge and
therefore should have communicated a warning to the potential victim. There
is no reason to muse, as the majority do, about the result that would follow if
defendants merely should have known of the threatened violence.
Id. at 709, 669 P.2d at 49, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 813 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
In addition, the standard of actual knowledge is implied when liability is imposed
for failing to take affirmative steps to detain a patient when the criteria for further
commitment are met. See supra notes 62-64. In contrast, although the Peterson psy-
chiatrist, Dr. Miller, testified at trial that his patient was a "potentially dangerous per-
son" who was "quite likely" to use angel dust again and was "likely to continue having
delusions and hallucinations," Dr. Miller also knew that Knox could not be committed
under the present mental illness law, which proscribed commitment solely because of
drug abuse. 100 Wash. 2d at 428, 671 P.2d at 237.
[Vol. 11:255
1988] Psychiatrist's Duty to Protect 281
cess is great. Overcrowding of current institutions will be cer-
tain as psychiatrists seek to avoid liability at all costs. The
unfortunate result will not only be the lessening of fundamen-
tal personal liberty rights, but the inability of those individuals
truly needing therapeutic care or treatment to receive services
necessary to make them productive or contributing members
of society. Whether the current goals of involuntary civil com-
mitment can exist with this expanded liability is certain to
spark intense and continuing social policy debate.
